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Abstract: 
The paper suggests an innovative contribution to the investigation of banking liabilities 
pricing contracted by sovereign agents. To address fundamental issues of banking, the study 
focuses on the determinants of the up-front fees (the up-front fee is a charge paid out at the 
signature of the loan arrangement). The investigation is based on a uniquely extensive sample 
of bank loans contracted or guaranteed by 58 less-developed countries sovereigns in the 
period from 1983 to 1997. The well detailed reports allow for the calculation of the equivalent 
yearly margin on the utilization period for all individual loan. The main findings suggest a 
significant impact of the renegotiation and agency costs on front-end borrowing payments. 
Unlike the sole interest spread, the all-in interest margin better takes account of these costs. 
The model estimates however suggest the non-linear pricing is hardly associated with an 
exogenous split-up intended by the borrower and his banker to cover up information. Instead 
the up-front payment is a liquidity transfer as described by Gorton and Kahn (2000) to 
compensate for renegotiation and monitoring costs. The second interesting result is that banks 
demand payment for all types of sovereign risk in an identical manner public debt holders do. 
The difference is that, unlike bond holders, bankers have the possibility to charge an up-front 
fee to compensate for renegotiation costs. Hence, beyond the information related issues, the 
higher complexity of the pricing design makes bank loan optimal for lenders on sovereign 
capital markets, especially relative to public debt, thus motivating for their presence. The 
paper contributes to the expanding literature on loan syndication and banking related issues. 
The study also has relevance for the investigation of the developing countries debt pricing. 
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Empirical work strongly suggests that bank loans are different from corporate bonds in domestic as 
well as international capital markets. Authors have emphasized the renegotiation, screening and 
monitoring advantage of banks to explain this difference. In  this paper, I provide evidence that 
banks also gain a valuable advantage associated with the complex contract design and the time at 
which payments are collected. Indeed, unlike private placement and bonds, the remuneration of 
bank lending is typically composed of a battery of fees and commissions along with the interest 
rate. Mills and Terrell (1984), Booth and Chua (1995) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) document 
that these fees, especially the up-front fee, drive substantial amounts. The up-front fee is a 
compensation that is paid out at the signature of the contract to lenders. Unlike other fees, it does 
not compensate for other services but lending (other fees include commitment, arranging, and 
agency fees). 
I believe up-front payments contain an element of compensation for risks and renegotiation. 
Gorton and Kahn (2000) suggest that, unlike bondholders, bankers price the loan so that they 
minimize subsequent costs associated with moral hazard and renegotiation. As a consequence, 
initial loan pricing may involve transfers from the borrower to the bank in the form of up-front fees. 
Also, Thakor and Udell (1987) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) find evidence of the non-linear 
pricing on commitment facilities being associated with the presence of informational asymmetries 
regarding the creditworthiness of the borrower, up-front fees acting as a screening device. This is 
consistent with my findings. 
However there are additional potential economic motivations for the non-linear compensations 
of bank credits. Conventional practice asserts that fees paid on the unused balance are aimed at 
reimbursing sunk administrative and commitment costs (Mills and Terrell, 1984)). Instead, 
empirical findings (see James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1990; Chemmamur and Fulghieri, 
1994) support the ability of financial intermediaries to collect private information on the borrower 
(see Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992). Provided interest premiums are typically the   2
publicized pricing component, this suggests that the non-linear pricing is aimed at voluntarily 
biasing the publicized interest premium so that interest rates would not reveal the private 
information. I do not find evidence suggesting that front-end payments are aimed at concealing 
information. 
I investigate the design of bank loans contracted by sovereign states because the absence of 
enforceability means and collateral in these markets allows for the disentangling between 
renegotiation and default risks. Indeed, in a reputation-lending framework, private creditors deny 
future access to capital markets to sovereign defaulters (see Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Cole, Dow 
and English, 1995; Grossman and Han, 1999). The indebted government thus strategically 
considers either to negotiate new terms on existing bank debts or to default on both the bond and 
bank debts. There are no partial defaults nor assets liquidation. Therefore, I can easily isolate the 
renegotiation risks associated with temporarily shortage of cash (i.e. liquidity risks) from the 
default risks associated with insolvency (i.e. the debts exceed what the borrower will ever be able 
to repay). 
Interestingly, studies on international debt markets show that, unlike bond yield margins, the 
interest margins on sovereign bank debts are insignificantly sensitive to indicators of liquidity 
default (Edwards, 1986; Boehmer and Megginson, 1990; Eichengreen and Mody, 2000). Arguably, 
authors claim that the small number of lenders and their cohesive behavior that features bank debts 
in contrast to dispersed bond holders, allow for cost free debt settlements (Folkerts-Landau, 1985; 
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). As a consequence, bonds margins include both the liquidity and the 
solvency risks while bank loans charge for default only. I do not question the renegotiation ability 
of banks. Instead, I claim this constitutes a valuable asset for the borrower that is in reality 
compensated front-end in the way described by Gorton and Kahn (2000). This is consistent with 
my results.   3
The findings are based on a relatively extensive and reasonably heterogeneous sample of bank 
loans contracted or guaranteed by LDC sovereigns in the fifteen-year period from January 1983 to 
December 1997. I find that the up-front fees pay for the expected costs associated with 
renegotiation and information asymmetries. By contrast, both the hypotheses of a fixed cost and 
concealed information relative to public debt markets are rejected. 
The paper is related to the literature on the design of bank loans, focusing on the non-linear 
structure of pricing. The results highlight the advantage that bankers extract from the complex 
contract design compared with other capital markets participants. 
The paper is also related to the literature on the role of financial intermediaries in capital 
markets, particularly in sovereign debts markets. The results highlight the renegotiation service that 
banks provide. The compensations are channeled through a more complex timing of compensations 
collection. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I provide some background in sovereign 
lending and bank credits and list the implications that would motivate the non-linear pricing of 
bank loans. After that, I present in section 2 the model of sovereign debt with and without 
exogenous pricing split-up and the empirical models. Section 3 describes the sampling procedure, 
the actuarial methodology, and the constructed database. The results are reported in section 4. I find 
strong support for fees being related to renegotiation costs (short-term risks) and information 
asymmetries. I report the robustness tests in section 5. In the final section I summarize the results 
and provide some concluding remarks. 
1.  Sovereign debt and bank loans – the theories and their implications 
1.1.  Contracting costs 
The widespread argument among bankers is that the payment effected up-front is intended to 
guarantee the refund of administrative sunk costs. Mills and Terrell (1984) mentioned this point. I 
also frequently heard this argument during my interviews with syndicated loan managers. However,   4
such a justification of the custom has its limitations, especially in sovereign capital markets. First, 
there are no reasons to believe that the agent of the syndicate is unable to distribute fixed incomes 
to the providers according to the various interest margins (instead of a payment made up-front). 
Second, provided there exists no collateral, the amount paid up-front is reducing the probability of 
repayment of the same amount. The implicit higher interest margin (the so-called all-in margin) 
simply applies to the lower loan volume. Nevertheless, the refund of fixed-lending costs constitutes 
my first hypothesis. 
1.2.  Collusion between the debtor and the banker to bias interest margins 
Previous authors have provided strong evidence of the ability of banks to collect inside 
information (e.g. Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992) and empirical work confirmed this ability (e.g. James, 
1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989). Hence, other capital markets participants are likely to pay 
larger attention at bank loans pricing. Moreover, reports of bank loans in specialized banking 
reviews show that interest margins spreads receive more publicity than any other remuneration. 
The interest premium may thus become a benchmark, the publicized loan rate being a 
creditworthiness proxy freely available. To the extent of my knowledge, I know no study that has 
investigated the impact of bank margins on bond yield premiums. Although this would be a very 
interesting topic, it is not yet my concern here. I will merely assume that this is a likely feature of 
capital markets. Provided this impact exists, the borrower and the lender may be tempted to bias the 
margin by creating side less significant payments such as up-front fees. By positively affecting the 
borrower’s grading, the latter pay lower premiums on her public debts. Not only would this have a 
positive impact on the borrower’s wealth, but also this creates a wealth transfer to bankers’ assets 
value. Therefore, both the borrower and the lender have immediate interest in colluding and scatter 
the overall payment into various fees.   5
1.3.  Compensations for expected renegotiation 
The macroeconomic studies of the pricing of sovereign debts have produced questionable 
results. Folkerts-Landau (1985) argues that, by promoting the ease of renegotiating new terms on 
the loan contract, the reduced number of lending banks relative to bondholders promote the facility 
to renegotiate the terms on the liability contract. As what the author sees is a proof, the descriptive 
comparison between yield premiums on bond debts and interest spreads on bank loans shed light on 
larger bond yield premiums. Edwards (1986) extends the analysis and shows that public debt-
holders charge significantly for liquidity risks, while bankers do not. Similar results are described 
in e.g. Boehmer and Megginson (1990), Min (1998), Eichengreen and Mody (2000). 
However, the more complex workouts also make bond debts implicitly senior to private debt. 
This feature takes higher importance in the sovereign debt m arkets where, because of the lack of 
enforceability means and collateral, the seniority that is mentioned on contracts is eventually 
meaningless. Moreover, settlement is unlikely to be cost free so that I suspect that renegotiation 
prospects actually make the banking liability more sensitive to liquidity risks than bonds, which 
actually benefit from the liquidity insurance provided by bankers. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
the bank facility should bear lower costs than bonds and why liquidity risks have no impact on its 
price. I believe the absence of liquidity risks compensations in the sovereign bank debts interest 
margins is related to the sharper clear-cut between the cash shortage and the insolvency risks. 
Indeed, more recent studies in domestic markets find that the smaller is the number of banks 
that fund new credit facilities, the larger is the impact on the value of the firm (Preece and 
Mulineaux, 1996). Banks are likely to provide renegotiation services. Also, Gorton and Kahn 
(2000) who view the banker as a renegotiation services provider, show that initial terms of the debt 
are not set to price default but rather are designed to balance bargaining power in later 
renegotiation. As a consequence, initial loan pricing may involve transfers either from the borrower 
to the bank in the form of front-end payments or from the bank to the borrower in the form of   6
under-priced services. Although the author’s conclusions rely on the seniority of bank loans that is 
inexistent in sovereign capital markets, the banks can still threaten their debtor of a lending 
termination. This is actually in line with macroeconomic studies of sovereign loan pricing. 
1.4.  Screening device 
Other explanations of the non-linear structure of bank loan pricing have relied on screening in 
asymmetric information environments (Thakor and Udell, 1987; Shockley and Thakor, 1997) with 
an application to loan commitments.
1 Indeed, the authors provide empirical evidence suggesting 
that fees paid on used balance are meant to screen in the presence of informational asymmetries. 
The takedown decision is contingent on the quality of the borrower's project. The intuition is that 
the lower quality investor will favor (usage) fees paid on takedown amounts since her probability 
of making use of the loan is lower. This indicates the borrower's investment quality. The empirical 
evidence reported by Shockley and Thakor (1997) is consistent with the self-selection pattern. 
I believe the results can be extended to term loans contracted by sovereign states. Indeed, at 
every repayment date, the sovereign borrower can decide either to repay or default without any 
seizure threat on her assets. Opting for repayment guarantees the loan renewal while defaulting 
would instead restrict access to foreign capital. The borrower hence holds a put option on 
repayment flows until the maturity date, debt principal and interest installments constituting the 
payment for future capital. Given this feature, the lower quality borrower will favor higher interest 
margins because she can renegotiate or default them later on. Providing higher front-end payments 
would therefore signal the commitment to repaying in the future, given that the overall cost remains 
equal. A lso, it signals the current liquidity availability and projects quality. Hence, the fourth 
possible motivation for front-end payments is related to agency problems and the asymmetric 
information the lender faces. Alongside the spread, bankers would use the up-front payments as a 
screening device in asymmetric information environment on a similar way as described by 
Shockley and Thakor (1997).   7
2.  Empirical approach. 
2.1. Sovereign loan pricing 
In this section I suggest an extension of the sovereign risk-sharing model proposed by Feder 
and Just (1977), and subsequently extended by e.g. Edwards (1986), Boehmer and Megginson 
(1990), Min (1998). The model has been frequently used for sovereign debts pricing analyses and 
has become a standard model. 
Assume the economy is a one-period economy composed of three agents, the sovereign and two 
bankers. Bankers are risk-neutral and compete on price. The sovereign agent seeks to borrow a 
certain amount q at date 0. At date 1, the borrower strategically defaults on principal and interest 
repayment with probability p. The unique alternative is the full repayment with probability 1-p. The 
creditor has no alternative but to accept the borrower decision. This follows the reputation 
hypothesis and the consequent credit disruption presented in the previous section.
3 The loan is 
remunerated by the interest rate composed of the floating benchmark free-rate i, usually the London 
inter-bank euro-currency rate (LIBOR) and the spread over the benchmark. For simplicity purpose I 
assume the refinancing interest rate and the treasury free-rate are equal. Suppose r is the mark-up. 
The expected value of the banker's present profit p is: 
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1
r
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Risk-neutral bankers compete on price r so that expected profits break even. r is therefore 
determined by an increasing function of the probability of default: 
E(p) = 0 implies  (1)
1-
p
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p
=+   (1)   8
2.2. Sovereign loan pricing with an exogenous split-up 
Alternatively, consider a contract in which, for some exogenous reasons (e.g. a collusion 
between the banker and her client), the borrower pays a share j of r in the form of a commission 
paid at date 0. The new contract is defined by (q, r, j) where q is the loan size, r is the interest 
margin and j is the share of r paid out at the signature of the contract. The so-called up-front fee is 
then j.r. The outstanding share is still paid at date 1 as post-disbursement payment (or spread) S 
equals (1- j).r. The expected present profit is hence: 
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Risk-neutral bankers compete on the so-called all-in interest margin r so that expected profits 
break even. r is therefore determined as an increasing function of the probability of default p and 
share j of the all-in interest margin r paid up-front: 
E(p) = 0 implies 
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Note that the equivalent loan contract (q’, r, 0) with size q’ equals q(1- j r) and thus 0 up-front 
payments yields a higher all-in interest spread r’: 
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Specifically, when j equals zero we obtain the model described by Edwards (1986). When  i 
and j equal zero, that is the contract modeled by Feder and Just (1977). r and S are therefore two 
decreasing convex functions on j and increasing concave functions on i. The more is paid up-front 
the smaller is the risk exposure. The remuneration is null when repayment is sure and goes to   9
infinite when the probability of default tends to one. The spread S as estimated in previous studies 
is thus substantially biased if there exists a share j of the remuneration paid up-front. 
Since the decision variable is binary, let us assume the probability of default p is logistic 
distributed as a function of a set of exogenous macroeconomic determinants X: 
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The obtained natural logarithm of compensations on contract (q,r,0), i.e. without any exogenous 
split-up, is: 
  lnln(1) rXi b¢ =++   (4) 
The log-remuneration of contract (q,r,j) i.e. with exogenous split-up, is: 
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As a result, the sign of the marginal impacts of exogenous factors on the all-in and the spread 
are identical. However, despite the identical sign, the share paid up-front has a different impact on 
each price term. Call A(j,X) = [j (1 + i)(1 + e
b’X) + (1 – j)] > 0 for all real vector X and 0<j<1, 
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Hence, assuming the up-front fee is the result of a split-up of the risk premium, one would 
expect a negative impact of the share of the remuneration paid in the form of fees j on both the   10 
spread and the all-in margin. This yields several implications for the specification of the empirical 
model. 
2.3. The empirical model 
The linear model 
The specified linear model explores the determinants of the pricing elements on sovereign bank 
loans. The pricing elements are the all-in margin, the interest spread, and the up-front fee. For 
specificity purpose, the up-front fee is estimated as an equivalent yearly payment on used balances. 
The price term linear models are specified by: 
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where a subscript j indicates that the variable refers to the jth contract. Similarly, a subscript i 
indicates a variable regarding the ith country, and m the issue date (month). Upper-case coefficients 
indicate vectors. Price term stands either for the interest spread, the annualized up-front payment or 
the all-in margin. 
The dummies correct for the presence of specific terms on the contract and for the temporary 
adverse economic environment. Two dummy variables indicate the benchmark rate is respectively 
the US and J apanese primary rates. Time dummies correct for year 1995 that witnessed the 
Mexican crisis aftermath, and 1997-year end after the Thai currency had collapsed. The last dummy   11 
indicates the presence of a tax-spare clause in the contract that states the interest payments on loan 
will not be subject to any withholding tax. 
Liquidity is proxied by the amount of foreign currency reserves available to the sovereign 
relative to the public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) short-term debt. This indicator is inspired by 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000). The ratios of reserves relative to imports and the short-term debt 
relative to exports are two alternative variables. However, it turned out that the latter contains no 
additional information. The liquidity variable indicates the probability of a temporary foreign-
currency shortage. In the sovereign debt perspective, this indicates default and the subsequent 
credit disruption is not necessarily maximizing the country's wealth. Instead, the sovereign will 
seek to renegotiate the loan arrangements. The liquidity variable, hence, indicates the perspective of 
renegotiation rather than debt repudiation. Therefore, the sign of y3 is expected to be negative on 
all pricing values. However, liquidity impact was found insignificant on previous studies on 
sovereign debt spreads. 
The solvency indicator is constructed as the ratio of the total amount of PPG long-term debt (the 
lifetime being longer than a year) relative to GNP. Solvency indicates the extent to which the total 
amount of liabilities is likely to be larger than expected cash flows. Should it be the case, 
reputation-based sovereign debt theories show that strategic default (repudiation) is the sovereign 
debtor’s optimal decision. In previous studies the sign of y4 was significantly positive on the 
spread. I expect similar results. Not necessarily should the impact be significant on the up-front fee. 
The second set of exogenous variables is constituted of the country's macroeconomic 
fundamentals indicators that follow the recent empirical literature on sovereign and international 
risk, mainly Eichengreen and Mody (2000), Min (1998), Cantor and packer (1996), and Bohemer 
and Megginson (1990). The inflation is determined by the month-to-month yearly consumer prices 
growth in the issuing country. It indicates the monetary policy consistency. The sign of  y 2 is 
expected to be positive on all pricing terms. Per capita income growth is calculated as the average   12 
value of the GNP per capita yearly return over the last five years. The ratio of the gross domestic 
investment relative to the GNP indicates the long-run growth expectations as well as, to some 
extent, the government’s commitment to development. The sign of y5 is expected to be negative on 
all terms of pricing. 
The two following variables are aimed at assessing the validity of the asymmetric information 
hypothesis to motivate non-linear pricing. The variability of growth is calculated as the variability 
of  income per capita growth in the last five years. It captures the uncertainty on income. It also 
proxies for the amount of potential asymmetric information. y6 is expected to be positive for both 
the interest spread and the fees. The impact on the spread indicates risk aversion while the impact 
on the fees will indicate the potential of agency costs. The ambiguous interpretation should be 
clarified with the use of an estimate of  how well known the debtor is among creditors. This is 
proxied by the size of debtor's commercial debt relative to the overall LDC debt. The share of the 
private creditors' asset is similar to the variable defined as the book value of debt plus the market 
value of equity utilized by Shockley and Thakor (1997). The impact on the spread  should be 
insignificant while I expect a negative impact on fees. 
Finally, the share of bond debts relative to the total private creditors debt (bank loans and 
bonds) isolates the incentive for collusion between the sovereign and the banker so that the interest 
spread is publicized with a bias. The ratio indicates the weight of public markets in the sovereign 
private creditors debt and, therefore, the higher is the share, the higher is the incentive to conceal 
information. This will be consistent with a negative impact on the spread together with a positive 
impact on the up-front fees and the share of up-front payments in the combined remuneration. 
Possibly, this variable will create confusion with the cross-monitoring hypothesis tested by Booth 
(1992). This is why the collusion hypothesis will be consistent if the ratio has an insignificant 
impact on the combined cost, as well.   13 
The extended linear model 
The approach outlined above enables to identify the effect of the presence of asymmetric 
information and renegotiation risks on the spread and the up-front fee. In other words, this is the 
effect one expects should there be no trade-off between the spread and the fee, the size of the debt 
market testing for this. The extended model is derived from the marginal impact described by 
equation [5] : 
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where Xj,i,m is the vector of explanatory variables as described above. Share is the calculated 
share of the all-in yearly payment paid front-end. Margins are the interest spread and the all-in 
margin. I test whether the fee results from an exogenous split-up agreed by the banker and her 
customer. This is consistent with the share having a negative marginal impact on both the spread 
and the all-in cost as described in Equations (4) and (5). Moreover, if this was true, there may be a 
co-linearity with the size of the public debt relative to the commercial debt, but not with other 
variables. 
The non-linear model 
Finally in a third extended non-linear specification, I focus more precisely on the collusion 
hypothesis. Because I find that the inclusion of the share paid up-front has a dramatic statistical 
effect on other explanatory variables, I want to verify whether the non-linear model outperforms 
the linear specification. The non-linear model specification follows equation [4] : 
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where subscripts and variables are the same as described previously and Share is the share of 
the all-in cost paid up-front. 
3.  Sampling and data description 
3.1. Sampling procedure 
The sample of contracts is obtained from  IFR Platinum, issued by  Thomson Financial. I 
checked and completed the information by reading through the related articles in the International 
Financing Review  (IFR), of which the  IFR Platinum is the electronic version. There are two 
additional major sources surveying banking loan contracts, namely Loanware from Euromoney and 
Loan Pricing Corporation from Reuters Company.
4 I chose the IFR because it provides larger 
amounts of information regarding the borrower, the disbursements/repayments schedules, and the 
fees. In particular, the IFR also indicates for some contracts the respective amounts on which fees 
are to be paid so that I could calculate the average value of up-front payments. 
I selected all loans issued or guaranteed by states, governments, monetary central authorities, 
and public enterprises and agencies situated in countries ranked as low or middle income by the 
World Bank in 1998 or 1999.
5 Non-guaranteed debts issued by public enterprises and agencies 
were retained where the debtor could reasonably be assimilated to a quasi-sovereign entity.
6 Notice 
that the selection of sovereign borrowers permits the exclusion of commercial risk to focus on 
specific sovereign risks. This is very important although almost absent in the previous literature. In 
the extent of my knowledge, Eichengreen and Mody (2000) first make the distinction. The authors 
indeed find a significant higher spread charged on international bank loans to private borrowers 
relative to sovereigns. 
The second requirement in the contracts selection is a minimum amount of information 
regarding the size of the loan, the duration, and the interest rate. Loans were contracted between 
January 1983 and December 1997. Hence, of the 1750 contracts collected in the first place, only   15 
781 had the appropriate prerequisites. However, of these 781 contracts, 679 are usable in the 
statistical analysis.
7 
The information recorded for each contract is the signature date of the contract, the identity, the 
type and geographic location of the borrower, the type and purpose of use of the loan, the currency 
of disbursement and repayment, the global, original and issued amounts in denominated currency 
and (current) US dollars. The disbursement and repayment schedule information includes the 
possible draw down and grace period, the number of tranches, the repayment frequency and period, 
bullet or balloon repayment. Interest payments are described by the f ixed interest rate or the 
floating benchmark rate and the spread. All types of fees are indicated with the related amounts. 
However, provided that reports are often incomplete, a blank in place of fees remains ambiguous. 
This may mean fees were absent in the contract or the report was incomplete. 
3.2. Calculation of the all-in margin 
Beyond the interest margin, the all-in cost margin is an essential element for the acceptance of 
the loan. The calculation methodology, however, varies slightly according to the actuarial officer. 
This is why, except for a few exceptions, I follow the standard method suggested in Rhodes (2001), 
p. 136-144. It consists of the discounted cash-flows analysis where present values of every single 
cost is calculated and then annualized over the average life of the loan. 
Hence, the first step consists of the determination of the discounting free rate. I selected 
redemption yield of the government benchmark bond associated with the currency and maturity of 
the contract. Yield values are monthly averages and the month is the signature month. Retaining 
monthly instead of daily values reduces the bias due to temporary shocks. Moreover, this is 
consistent with the typical timetable of the syndicate formation presented by Rhodes (2001), p. 149. 
Facility negotiations and allocations are made in the last four weeks preceding the closing date. 
Bond yields reports are compiled from Datastream.
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The second step consists of the calculation of the respective present value amounts paid in the 
form of fees and the interest rate spread. Notice that the spread may vary over the life of the loan. 
Annualizing all spread remuneration provides with the  average spread. Previous studies have 
ignored this fact taking into account the first reported spread only. This gives higher support to this 
approach adopted in this study. Moreover, in a typical syndicated loan, compensations paid out at 
the signature date vary in basis points in function of the committed amount and the rank of the 
lender in the syndicate. The total front-end payments therefore are a function of the fees 
percentage-values and the number of banks at each rank. The IFR provides the former for each 
contract but not always the committed amounts nor the number of banks. Therefore, an average 
share of the front-end payments that is paid at each rank is calculated based on the sample of 
observations with complete information. This proxy is in turn used for the contracts with 
incomplete report. 
The next step consists of the calculation of the average life of the loan.
9 Time is divided into 
monthly periods and for every single period I determine the outstanding disbursed amount. The 
sum of these values is divided by the size of the loan to obtain the average lifetime. Last, I 
annualize (i.e. calculate the internal rate of return of) the present values of each of the individual 
payments over the average duration. This provides the equivalent yearly margin over the 
benchmark interest rate on the utilization period of up-front payments. I add together this value to 
the interest spread so that I obtain the all-in margin, which is here the equivalent interest spread 
over the benchmark that comprises the designed interest spread  and the annualized front-end 
payments.
10 
3.3. Description of the sample 
The sample includes 679 observations of loan contracts from banks to LDC sovereign 
borrowers for which information is available on pricing structure (spread, index, and fees), loan 
size, term-to-maturity, and borrowing sovereign. 58 countries are represented. The oldest contract   17 
was signed in January 1983 and the most recent in December 1997. This is a large number relative 
to previous studies. Indeed, Mills and Terrell (1984) based their study on a sample of 183 
syndicated Euro-credits in the three year 1981-1983. Booth and Chua (1995) focused on a sample 
of corporate debt issued between 1987 and 1989. Last, Shockley and Thakor (1997) analyze loan 
commitments and lines of credits purchased in 1989 and 1990 in the US. 
Summary statistics of the terms of the contracts in the sample are displayed in Table [1]. 
Frequencies and average values of costs of contracts are displayed by year and country in Table [2] 
and Table [3], respectively. The two principal issuers of sovereign loan contracts are Turkey 
(19.9% of the total number of contracts) and Brazil (16.8%). In (constant) dollar amount terms, 
Turkey also comes first (14.8%) followed by Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and India. These five 
countries represent half of the total amount in the panel. This is consistent with figures reported in 
the World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF). However, I find total volumes have a 
striking breakdown in the mid-eighties. Following their financial recovering during the late 
eighties, the major LDC sovereign loan issuers withdrew from the syndicated loan market and 
turned to public bond markets. For example, GDF report that only 5% of Brazilian international 
debt contracted from private creditors was in the form of bonds in the early 1990s. In 1996, it 
represented 82%. The debt on Argentina and Mexican followed a similar pattern. 
Of the 679 contracts, 435 are reported with the up-front fees. The average share in the overall 
sample is of 19.4% of the combined remuneration. Up-front fees amount to 0.743% on average, 
representing US$ 1.1 million (in 1995 constant US dollars) in an average 153 million US dollar 
loan. The average fees payment is also very heterogeneous among countries. An extreme case is 
Nigeria, which paid 4.33% of the loan amount in flat fees. This was superior to the mark-up 
remuneration itself. 
The findings are consistent with previous studies. Although the level of the spread and the 
equivalent margin fee in percentage are lower in their sample, Mills and Terrel (1984) find up-front   18 
fee pay for 19% of total return of the public debtors Euro-credit loans. The figure is similar in my 
sample. Alternatively, Booth and Chua (1995) find that the average up-front fee on term loans 
amounts to 1.05%. This is 40% higher than the up-front payment on sovereign private debt. The 
authors also report 47% of their sample with up-front fee while my sample of sovereign loans 
report the presence of such a fee on 65% of the contracts. Finally, Shockley and Thakor (1997) find 
only a mean up-front fee of 26% on loan commitments to US publicly traded firms. Interestingly, 
the difference is function of the type of debtor and the likely amount of public information. I find 
similar results. Moreover, the high amounts of money driven by up-front fees along with their 
heterogeneity constitute a preliminary evidence of the little relevance of the contracting cost 
hypothesis and give credit to the creditworthiness and asymmetric information hypotheses. The 
next section presents the results of the estimates and their interpretation. 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1. Estimation 
All contracts are considered individually. This allows a direct analysis of the interaction 
between the terms designed on the contract. The fundamentals indicators are implemented as 
exogenous variables. Their number has been simplified relative to previous studies. This is 
intended to avoid any misspecification due to multi-colinearity. Therefore, every factor is proxied 
by one variable. Tests of multi-colinearity are run after every estimate to ensure the validity of 
results. I use the variance inflation factors test. 
Exogenous macroeconomic and debt indicators are obtained from the international development 
organizations which provide high quality public information on most of LDCs. Indeed, data are 
obtained from reports provided by local authorities and specialized internal economists. Consumer 
prices growth monthly data stem from the International Financial Statistics, published by the IMF. 
All other variables are collected on a yearly basis from the tables provided by the  Global 
Development Finance and the World Development Indicators, both published by the World Bank.   19 
The World Bank's tables present the advantage of being homogenized and thus more convenient 
(relative to the IMF tables in particular). Missing figures are obtained from the IMF and World 
Bank country surveys, the joint tables jointly published by the IMF-World Bank-OECD-BIS
11 and 
various Economist Intelligence Unit Country Reports. See appendix for further details. However, 
missing values in the accounting variables restrict the sample. This explains the difference in the 
number of observations. 
4.2. Funding costs and price disclosure 
Table [4] summarizes the OLS estimates of the model’s parameters. The dependent variable in 
columns (a), (b) and (d) is the logarithm of the average spread over the basis interest rate. The 
dependent variable in columns (c) and (e) is the logarithm of the all-in margin which combines the 
interest spread and the up-front fees. The first estimated models reported for the spread and the all-
in margin, all independent parameters are implemented. None of other contract terms are 
implemented. Column (a) shows that the spread responds significantly to all indicators except 
Liquidity. The insignificant impact of  Liquidity is consistent with previous results presented by 
Edwards (1986) and subsequent studies of the spread on sovereign debt in LDCs. On the other 
hand, long-term indicators, Solvency and dIncome, are as expected significant at the level 0.01, 
with high t-statistics respectively of 4.03 and -4.14. However, the presence of a large public debt 
market drives both the spread and the combined all-in margin down at the significance level 0.01. 
This contradicts the collusion hypothesis. Interestingly, this is consistent with the cross-monitoring 
hypothesis presented in Booth (1991). The size of the debtor liabilities in the LDC debt market has 
a significant positive impact on the spread and the combined all-in yearly margin. This result is 
probably consistent with risk exposure issues instead of asymmetries of information. The 
participants in capital markets being already highly exposed (large ratio), they request a higher 
lending premium.   20 
The estimated all-in margin that combines up-front fees and interest spread  in a yearly 
equivalent margin is significantly determined by all factors. Results, hence, contrast with the spread 
model estimates. Although being larger than its significance impact on the interest spread (0.954), 
0.22 is a low significance of  liquidity in statistics standards. Nevertheless, withdrawing Liquidity 
yields a substantial loss in the R-squared value. Therefore, the final model keeps this variable. 
Generally speaking, short-term and volatility indicators have a higher impact on the all-in margin. 
Long-run solvency have a lower impact. This provides preliminary evidence of the short-term 
factors being, indeed, remunerated through front-end payments. This contrasts with previous 
results. The interpretation of non-enforceability presented in Folkerst-Landau (1985), Edwards 
(1986), and Boehmer and Megginson (1990) are therefore likely to be inconsistent with the new 
data. Note the presence of a larger bond market also result significantly in a lower all-in 
remuneration at similar levels. This is inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis that predicts the 
size of the bond market should have an impact on the spread and fees separately, but not the 
combined payment. Instead, this is consistent with the cross-monitoring results presented by Booth 
(1992). 
Therefore, findings provide evidence of the collusion hypothesis being unlikely to determine 
the presence of up-front fees. Besides, the managing costs will probably determine to some extent 
the charges paid out at the signature by the borrower but is probably accompanied by other factors. 
4.3. Renegotiation and agency costs 
In columns (d) and (e) of Table 4, the share of the up-front payment is included in the model as 
an explanatory variable. This is intended to test the linear marginal impact as reported in equation 
[5]. Figures show that the share of the premium paid up-front has an opposite impact on spread and 
all-in margins. It is respectively negatively and positively significant at the level .01, with  t-
statistics of -3.76 and 2.75, respectively. This provides mixed evidence on fees resulting from the 
exogenous split of risk-remuneration. Equations [4] and [5] suggest that if the determination of the   21 
share was exogenous, it would have a negative impact on both the spread and the all-in. Moreover, 
the introduction of the share implies very different results suggesting strong multi-collinearities 
between the share and various indicators in particular indicators of liquidity shortage, variability of 
revenues, level of investment, and the size of the borrower's debt relative to the total LDC debt. It is 
therefore likely that the endogenous fees are determined by these factors. 
The linear regressions on up-front fees are presented in the second part of Table [4]. The 
dependent variable in columns (f) and (g) is the logarithm of the weighted mean of the up-front fees 
face value in percentage. The dependent variable in columns (h) and (i) is the logarithm of the 
equivalent margin in percentage above the floating basis rate. The dependent variable in columns 
(j) and (k) is the logarithm of the share of the debt combined cost (up-front fees and interest spread) 
paid up-front. The calculations of weights and present values were described in section 4.2. Results 
show strong evidence of fees being risk related. In both regressions on the face value and the 
equivalent margin, liquidity, growth of GNP per capita, variability of income are significant at level 
0.01. The signs are consistent with hypotheses. The face value of fees are significantly influenced 
by national investments and the size of the bond market, while inflation has a positive significant 
impact on the up-front fees calculated as a margin. The share of the total debt of the debtor in the 
total less-developed countries debt provides significant but contradictory results. It has a positive 
impact on the face value, whereas it is negative on the equivalent margin. 
Therefore, there is strong evidence of up-front payments being determined by renegotiation 
costs while the repudiation risk is insignificant. This gives support to analyses like Gorton and 
Kahn (2000). Moreover, the up-front fee is also associated with information availability (MktSize) 
and factors of asymmetric information (VdIncome). This is consistent with Shockley and Thakor 
(1997).   22 
5.  Robustness 
5.1. Other terms in the contract 
Regressions of the face value and equivalent fees on other terms of the loan contract are 
presented in Table [5]. The estimates replicate the model presented by Mills and Terrell (1984) and 
estimated with a sample of loans issued during the period 1981-1983. I too find a highly significant 
relationship between the fees in face value or equivalent margin form and the spread and the 
duration of the loan. The estimated average life is actually of a lower explicative performance. 
These results are similar to the ones described by Mills and Terrell (1984). The authors interpreted 
these results as evidence of fees functioning as a device for service compensation along with hiding 
information to public markets, namely the fixed-cost and the inside information hypotheses. In the 
light of the results reported in table [4], the positive impact of the spread on the fees is likely to be 
due to colinearity. I showed there were outstanding differences despite the set of common 
macroeconomic factors. Error terms also respond poorly to normality tests, while the normality 
hypothesis of the error terms predicted by model ( i) in Table [4] are not rejected at standard 
significance levels. 
Moreover I make a separate estimate of the determinants of the share of the yearly premium 
paid up-front. The OLS estimates of the share of the remuneration paid up-front is presented in the 
second part of Table [4], columns (j) and (k). The significance of the equation is rather low. The 
indicators of liquidity holding and uncertainty regarding revenues are both statistically significant 
at the level .01, with  t-statistics of  -6.38 and 3.22, respectively. The size of debt is here too 
negatively significant at level 0.01. Unsurprisingly, the results are similar to the model related to 
the annualized up-front fee reported in columns (h) and (i). However, statistic diagnosis show 
poorer performance of error terms in particular.   23 
5.2. Selectivity bias 
My sample of syndicated loans is by no means comprehensive nor is it necessarily a random 
selection of the population. For instance, if the willingness of the issuers or arrangers to share data 
is to some extent related to the success of syndication or some other characteristics, estimates based 
on such data might be biased. To explore whether selectivity bias is a concern, I use a Heckman 
(1979) model. I calculated the difference in the mean values and the estimates of the new model. I 
remind that of the 679 observations with a reported spread, 244 have no fees reported. 
The selection equation relates the probability of the inclusion of the fees in the report to the 
potential public access to information and motivations for hiding. The facility for public access to 
information is proxied by the size of the issuing country (GNP), size of the loan, dummy for the 
type of borrower (pure sovereign vs. quasi-sovereign and public companies). The motivation for 
keeping information undisclosed is proxied by the size of the bond market and the level of interest 
spread itself (risky borrower). I use a probit of the full sample. Results show that apart from the 
interest mark-up, none of the factors have an impact on the reported fees. Moreover, despite the 
impact all coefficients equals zero cannot be rejected, individual coefficients are insignificantly 
modified. Hence, although the sample is not as comprehensive as one would like, I find no 
compelling evidence of selectivity bias. 
5.3. Estimate of the extended non-linear model 
In this section the least-squared estimates of the non-linear model described by equation [8] are 
presented. I implement the non-linear ordinary least squared model with Stata®. Starting values are 
derived from Table [4]. Results are reported in Table [6]. 
Respective coefficients associated with Inflation, Liquidity, Solvency, dIncome and V(dIncome) 
are found to be significant at the level 0.03, with t-statistics of 3.67, -2.56, 2.15, -2.29, and 3.44. 
Respective signs are consistent with the hypotheses. The size of the debt market relative to the 
LDC debt market and the share of bonds in the country's debt financing are found to be irrelevant to   24 
explain the spread. However, normality tests on the error terms perform poorly and therefore 
should be rejected. This adds further evidence of the up-front fees being unlikely to result from a 
collusion between borrowers and bankers to mislead capital markets actors. 
5.4. Endogeneity of the interest spread payments 
Interestingly, the spread paid on top of the basis interest rate may have some impact on the 
managing costs. For instance, the riskier borrower could yield higher administrative costs for the 
banker for executive meetings as well as information collection. The fees may too be a determinant 
of the spread if it acts as a price adjustment. To examine this possibility, I test for the endogeneity 
of the spread using the augmented regression procedure suggested by Hausman (1976). The test is 
based on the null hypothesis that the impact of the error term regressing the log of spread on all 
exogenous factors in equation (6) has an insignificant impact on the log of up-font. Results show 
that the null hypothesis that the interest spread is exogenous cannot be rejected (p-value equals 
0.858). Alternatively, OLS is a consistent estimator for the model. 
5.5. A thorough comparison with public markets 
To provide further evidence on the little explanatory power of the inside information hypothesis 
to explain the non-linear pricing, I do a contract-by-contract comparison of the pricing on pairs of 
bonds and loans which will present sufficient common characteristics. Indeed, previous literature 
has failed in determining which of a syndicated and a bond loan presents a higher spread. Both 
comparative studies presented by Folkerts-Landau (1985) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000) help 
very little since they are based on pooled data sets. They are designed to highlight the respective 
determinants of spreads on bank loans and primary bond issues instead of determining which of the 
two presents higher spreads. The sample of public debt primary issues is constituted of all euro-
currency primary issues of public loans launched by LDCs sovereigns during the period 1983-1997. 
They are floating rate denominated so that the spread can be compared more easily. All bonds are 
issued between 1983 and 1997. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table [7].   25 
I calculate the difference between the spread designed on syndicated loans and bonds at the 
primary issue date. Both types of loans display the same floating index and the lifetime is similar. 
The descriptive figures are displayed in Table [8]. The figures are displayed in function of the 
number of days separating the two issues. Results show that spreads on bank loans are higher than 
spreads on floating-rate bonds in general.
12 The findings contrast with Eichengreen and Mody 
(2000), which find primary issues bond spreads in their sample three times as large as syndicated 
loans spreads. Presumably, the difference is related to the little accuracy of the latter study resulting 
from the use of monthly-pooled data. 
For further details, Table [9] reports relevant terms of paired banks and bond debts launched in 
a less than 60 days window. Pairs of floating-rate notes are constituted of 25 syndicated loans and 
24 bonds. None of the eleven pairs of contracts designed with a similar currency and basis rate have 
lower spread on bank loans. The sample of fixed-rate notes is constituted of six bank loans and 
eight bond issues. For facility reasons, the pairs of fixed interest rate loans are not reported in the 
table. Again, fixed interest rates charged on bank loans are found at least as high as public debt 
interest rates. Interestingly, larger spreads are associated with more troubled periods. Therefore, the 
descriptive analysis provide further evidence of up-front fees being unlikely to be intended to 
downward bias publicized interest margins in the attempt to misprice bonds. 
6.  Summary and concluding remarks 
The paper suggests an innovative contribution to the investigation of the complex non-linear 
pricing of bank liabilities. The analysis is conducted in the sovereign debt markets where proxies 
for liquidity and solvency risks are more easily separable. By focusing on the determinants of the 
up-front fees (the up-front fee is a charge paid out at the signature date), the study addresses 
fundamental issues of the role of financial intermediaries, especially being a renegotiation insurer. 
It also looks at the potentiality for non-linear pricing to be a screening device, thus providing the 
banker with a contracting advantage. The investigation is based on a uniquely extensive sample of   26 
bank loans contracted or guaranteed by 58 less-developed countries sovereigns in the period 
between January 1983 and December 1997. The well-detailed reports allow for the calculation of 
the equivalent yearly margin on the utilization period for each individual loan. 
The main findings suggest a strong impact of the renegotiation costs on front-end borrowing 
payments while they hardly affect the interest mark-up. Interestingly, this is consistent with 
previous studies on sovereign international loans that focused on the sole interest spread. This is 
also consistent with Gorton and Kahn (2000) who predict that front-end payments compensate for 
renegotiation and monitoring costs. 
The second interesting result is that front-end payments are larger in an asymmetric information 
environment in similar manner as in Shockley and Thakor (1997). Namely, the banker uses front-
end payments to screen among borrowers of different creditworthiness. The lower quality borrower 
will favor higher interest margins because she can renegotiate or default them later on. Paying out 
larger compensations front-end would therefore signal the commitment to repaying in the future as 
well as the quality of the borrower’s projects, provided the overall cost remains equal. 
The inability to establish which of the screening and the liquidity insurance compensations is 
the main economic motivation for the non-linear pricing constitutes the main shortcoming of the 
paper. It should not however limit the contribution of my findings, namely that the ability of banks 
to create a complex non-linear pricing on their assets makes the latter special in capital markets. 
Whether this demonstrates that banks are rather liquidity insurer or that this constitutes an efficient 
signaling device making banks different deserves further investigation. I believe that the two 
hypotheses are not competitive though, and therefore front-end payments are used in both means. 
This should stimulate new avenues of research. 
By contrast, the results strongly rejects that the non-linear pricing is meant to bias publicized 
interest rates. The results also reject the attempt of the bankers to obtain administrative costs 
repayment front-end. If ever, these should be related to future renegotiation administrative costs.   27 
The findings also relate to the role of banks in sovereign debts markets. As a matter of fact, by 
contrast to previous studies, I find that banks demand payment for all types of default as well as 
renegotiation risks in identical manner public debt holders do. The difference is that, unlike 
bondholders, bankers have the possibility to design complex non-linear compensations so that 
renegotiation costs are paid out in the first place and also that bankers are more able to screen out 
sovereign debtors, which commit to repaying. Hence, the higher complexity of the pricing design to 
some extent provides economic motivations for the presence of sovereign bank debts although they 
benefit from no seniority.   28 
Appendix: List of Exogenous Variables and Data Source 
 
i  International free rate calculated as the Treasury Bill yield for the associated 
currency and maturity. Monthly average. 
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financial 
Inflation  Yearly consumer prices growth in the issuer economy. End of month.  
Source : The International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
Liquidity  Reserves of foreign currencies relative to public and publicly guaranteed short-
term debt of the issuer. End of year. 
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
Solvency  Public and publicly guaranteed debt to GNP in the issuer economy. End of year. 
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
dIncome  Five years average of GNP per capita growth in the issuer economy. End of year. 
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
For country i, year j = 0, 
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V(dIncome)  Five year variability of GNP per capita growth in the issuer economy. End of year.  
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
For country i, year j = 0, V(dIncome)i,j =  
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GNP per Capita growth GNP per capita growth over the last 5 years
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Investment  Yearly gross domestic investment relative to GDP. End of year.  
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 
MktSize  Amount of private creditors debt of the issuing country relative to the total amount 
of the private creditors contracted by all less-developed countries. End of year. 
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
Bond  Issuing country amounts of outstanding public and publicly guaranteed bond debt 
relative to the sum of banking and bond debt amounts. End of year. 
Source: Global Development Finance, The World Bank. 
Tax-Spare  Clause on the loan contract that prevents from with-holding tax payments.  
Source: The International Financing Review, Thomson Financial.   29 
 
                                                 
1  Also called revolving credit or line of credit. The loan commitment is a special type of loan where the bank commits 
to pay out the loan amount at any time the borrower desires until maturity. The loan is typically accompanied by a 
series of fees paid either before or after disbursements along with the interest rate. 
2  See for example the riots in Caracas that took place in February-March 1989 and the related speech of President 
Perez reported in the Financial Times March 4, 1989. Also, what happened more recently in Argentina, The 
Economist January 17, 2002. 
3  This is also consistent with the observation that the “negative pledge” and the “pari-passu” clauses are two standard 
covenants usually included in international bank loan contracts. See Wood (1995) 16-10 to 16-12 for further details. 
4  See Rhodes (2001) Appendix II for a complete listing of commercial databanks. 
5  Income based country ranking is function of per capita incomes. In 1999, middle- and lower-income countries 
rankings apply to countries for which per capita income in 1997 was below US$ 9,655. 
6  If necessary, the status is verified in the Articles of the company, where it should be written that the state would 
make sure the company will meet its (foreign) obligations. This is usually the case of national development banks, 
e.g. the Korean Development Bank, and national primary resources monopoles, e.g. the Sonatrach in Algeria. 
7  3 contracts include security clauses, 30 are revolving credits, 62 contracts are fixed rate loans. The reason why fixed-
rate loans were discarded is that I found inconsistently low interest rates with respect to the related free-rates. 
Moreover, the 2 loans denominated in Kuwait Dinar were deleted because I had no Kuwaiti benchmark free-rate. 
8  For limited issues reasons, 3 loans denominated in Swiss Francs and 9 in Austrian Sterling had no benchmark bond 
yields for the related maturity. For these contracts only, I selected the respective “official” 10-years benchmarks. 
9  Note that Mills and Terrell (1984) considered the overall loan lifetime. This results in a downward bias. 
10 Typically the all-in cost includes all costs. For simplification purpose, I use the same straightforward meaning term. 
11 Internet address: http://www1.oecd.org/dac/Debt/ 
12 I deleted the outlying observation for the Argentine Republic in 1995 for which I found a negative difference 
amounting to -270 basis points.   30
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the period 1983-1997 of the non-linear pricing of sovereign bank loans 
Statistics values of the terms on the syndicated loan contracts to LDC sovereigns during the period, 1983-1997. 
Spread is the average spread over the loan lifetime; Up- front fees is the weighted average of up-front fees in 
percentage; Annualized values are the estimated equivalent yearly margin on the utilization period; Combined all-
in margin is the equivalent yearly margin that combines interest spreads and up-front fees. All mean costs values 
are reported in percentage. Lifetime is the lifetime of the loan in number of years; Amount is the size of the issue 
in million of constant 1995 US dollars. 
Items  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Spread  679  1.110  0.792  0.100  6.330 
Up-front fees  435  0.743  0.772  0.000  5.210 
Annualized up-front fees  435  0.297  0.349  0.000  3.160 
Combined all-in margin  679  1.340  0.936  0.100  7.810 
Lifetime in years  679  6.870  3.570  0.250  25.25 
Size (1995 million US$)  679  153.0  452.0  0.015  7666   34
Table 2. Interest spreads and shares of the remuneration in the form of up-front fees by year 
Distribution and mean values of spread and share of remuneration in the form of up-front fees by signature year on 
the syndicated loan contracts to LDC sovereigns during the period, 1983-1997.  Observations is the number of 
observations; Mean is the mean value; Spread is the average spread over the loan lifetime (percentage); Share is the 
share of overall remuneration (spread and up-front fees) paid in the form of up-front fees (percentage). 
Year  Observations    Mean  Year  Observations    Mean 
  Share  Spread    Share  Spread    Share  Spread    Share  Spread 
1983  74  114    22.0  1.051  1991  16  26    30.0  0.790 
1984  69  109    16.5  1.481  1992  18  26    30.1  1.078 
1985  46  80    14.3  1.338  1993  21  30    20.0  1.085 
1986  26  41    18.1  0.759  1994  11  15    19.7  1.025 
1987  26  51    19.0  0.924  1995  20  25    19.0  1.725 
1988  28  39    19.9  0.655  1996  23  33    13.2  0.812 
1989  12  19    19.7  0.631  1997  28  47    16.7  1.498 
1990  17  25    27.6  0.586  Total  435  679    19.4  1.111   35
Table 3. Non-linear structure of pricing of bank loans for the period 1983-1997 by country 
Obs. is the number of observations; Spread is the mean spread over the loan lifetime (percentage); Share is the mean 
share of the combined remuneration (spread and up-front fees) paid up-front (percentage); Fees is the mean weighted 
average value of the up-front fees (percentage). 
Country  Obs.  Spread  Share  Fees  Country  Obs.  Spread  Share  Fees 
Algeria  10  0.688  15.0  0.526  Mauritius  1  3.000  .  . 
Antigua  1  2.500  1.20  0.125  Mauritania  1  1.500  24.0  1.266 
Argentina  9  1.408  17.0  0.542  Mexico  5  2.410  15.6  1.012 
Burundi  1  1.875  27.5  1.500  Nigeria  15  0.867  54.7  4.330 
Brazil  114  1.977  13.3  1.350  Nepal  1  1.250  13.6  0.559 
Barbados  4  1.311  8.80  0.498  Oman  10  0.437  17.8  0.334 
Chile  3  1.500  .  .  Panama  3  2.167  18.8  1.500 
Congo  6  1.729  27.6  1.600  Peru  1  2.250  7.50  0.750 
China  22  0.698  18.5  0.545  Philippines  12  1.207  7.20  0.367 
Cameroon  2  0.875  8.20  0.377  Pakistan  27  .9765  16.1  0.378 
Colombia  18  1.324  13.0  0.839  Paraguay  3  2.000  22.3  1.482 
Czech Rep.  1  0.450  6.00  0.068  Romania  1  5.600  .  . 
Ecuador  2  0.688  15.8  0.554  Russia  4  4.769  12.5  0.334 
Ethiopia  1  0.750  .  .  South Africa  12  0.573  15.8  0.205 
Gabon  3  1.041  21.4  1.070  Seychelles  1  2.000  21.7  0.807 
Ghana  4  0.725  45.6  0.551  South Korea  31  0.483  29.1  0.762 
Hungary  9  0.603  29.3  0.563  Sri Lanka  2  1.062  13.2  0.375 
Indonesia  2  1.500  4.50  0.300  Slovak Rep.  3  0.708  8.60  0.302 
India  55  0.385  16.0  0.334  Soviet Union  1  0.875  .  . 
Iraq  2  0.875  .  .  Slovenia  5  1.012  7.40  0.277 
Ivory Coast  2  1.688  19.9  1.828  Thailand  22  0.694  16.5  0.344 
Jamaica  3  1.250  .  .  Turkey  135  1.115  23.4  0.637 
Jordan  8  0.594  16.1  0.467  Trinidad  10  1.294  17.1  0.533 
Kazakhstan  1  3.250  4.50  0.317  Tunisia  21  0.624  15.7  0.418 
Kenya  2  0.750  52.6  0.454  Tanzania  3  1.333  47.9  1.125 
Lithuania  1  2.500  28.8  0.500  Uruguay  1  1.625  .  . 
Malaysia  42  0.335  13.8  0.270  Venezuela  3  1.542  11.6  0.500 
Macedonia  1  4.000  14.4  0.500  Zambia  1  1.500  .  . 
Morocco  3  1.292  15.0  0.148  Zimbabwe  12  0.835  44.2  0.488   36
Table 4. Models estimate 
Regression estimates of banking contracts pricing terms on macroeconomic indicators. The dependent variables in 
columns (a)-(b) and (d) is the logarithm of the average spread over the basis interest rate. The dependent variable in 
columns (c) and (e) is the logarithm of the equivalent margin above benchmark that combines the interest spread and 
up-front fees. Exogenous variables are: i is the government currency-and-maturity related monthly average bond 
yield; Inflation is the yearly month-to-month consumer prices increase; Liquidity is the foreign currencies reserves to 
short-term debt ratio, p -test (rejection probability) in parentheses; solvency is the ratio of public and publicly 
guaranteed long-term debt to GNP; dIncome is the last five years GNP-per-capita returns average; V(dIncome) is the 
variability of income per capita return in the last five years; Investment is the national gross investment to GNP ratio; 
MktSize is the share of the country private creditors debt relative to all LDC debt. Bond is the share of private 
creditors debt in the form of bonds; Tax-Spare indicates the presence of a clause exempting from withholding tax. t-
statistics in square parentheses. 
Regressors  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e) 
ln(l+i)  -2.683
**  -2.470
**  -2.871
**  -0.612  -1.107 
  [-2.240]  [-2.450]  [-2.380]  [-0.460]  [-0.830] 
ln(Share)  -  -  -  -0.150
***  0.109
*** 
        [-3.760]  [2.748] 
Inflation  0.213
***  0.214
***  0.193
***  0.402
***  0.377
*** 
  [4.541]  [4.600]  [4.081]  [4.958]  [4.674] 
Liquidity  -0.001  -0.022  -0.031  -0.035   
  [-0.018]  [-1.220]  [-1.350]  [-1.500]   
Solvency  0.567
***  0.587
***  0.507
***  0.587
***  0.541
*** 
  [4.027]  [4.612]  [3.575]  [3.359]  [3.110] 
dIncome  -3.770
***  -3.765
***  -4.523
***  -2.797
***  -3.950
*** 
  [-4.143]  [-4.147]  [-4.941]  [-2.686]  [-3.813] 
V(dIncome)  0.264
***  0.261
***  0.371
***  0.139
*  0.161
* 
  [3.070]  [3.070]  [4.292]  [1.646]  [1.922] 
Investment  -1.308
***  -1.233
***  -1.149
***  -0.621  -0.353 
  [-3.070]  [-3.380]  [-2.680]  [-1.259]  [-0.721] 
MktSize  3.155
***  3.174
***  2.710
***  0.470  0.420 
  [4.967]  [5.023]  [4.237]  [0.498]  [0.448] 
Bond  -0.350
***  -0.331
***  -0.314
**  -0.334
**  -0.313
** 
  [-2.610]  [-2.740]  [-2.330]  [-2.197]  [-2.069] 
Tax -Spare  -0.780
***  -0.777
***  -0.791
***  -0.870
***  -0.890
*** 
  [-7.100]  [-7.120]  [-7.160]  [-6.540]  [-6.780] 
Observations  616  616  616  390  390 
F  56.83  67.84  56.11  35.95  31.87 
R-squared  0.570  0.594  0.567  0.590  0.561 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a t-test.   37
Table 4. Models estimate (continued) 
The dependent variable in column (f)-(g) is the logarithm of the up-front fees in percentage as it appears on the 
contract. The dependent variable in columns (h)-(i) is the logarithm of the up-front fees expressed as an equivalent 
margin above the basis rate. The dependent variable in column (j)-(k) is the share of the up-front payment in the all-in 
cost that combines up-front fees and interest spread. Exogenous variables are: i is the government currency-and-
maturity related monthly average bond yield; Inflation is the yearly month-to-month consumer prices increase; 
Liquidity is the foreign currencies reserves to short-term debt ratio, p-test (rejection probability) in parentheses; 
solvency is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt to GNP; dIncome is the last five years GNP-per-
capita returns average; V(dIncome) is the variability of income per capita return in the last five years; Investment is the 
national gross investment to GNP ratio; MktSize is the share of the country private creditors debt relative to all LDC 
debt; Bond is the share of private creditors debt in the form of bonds; Tax-Spare indicates the presence of a clause 
exempting from withholding tax. 
Regressors  (f)  (g)  (h)  (i)  (j)  (k) 
In(l+i)  5.070
***  5.360
***  0.140  .  0.872  . 
  [2.517]  [2.710]  [-0.060]  .  [0.506]  . 
Inflation  -0.105  .  0.363
***  0.387
***  -0.0126  . 
  [-0.857]  .  [2.570]  [2.790]  [-0.120]  . 
Liquidity  -0.123
***  -0.127
***  -0.211
***  -0.220
***  -0.159
***  -0.159
*** 
  [3.630]  [-3.910]  [-5.410]  [-5.81]  [-5.500]  [-6.380] 
Solvency  0.329  .  0.319  .  -0.200  . 
  [1.240]  .  [1.040]  .  [-0.884]  . 
dIncome  -6.190
***  -6.260
***  -4.610
***  -5.850
***  -0.598  . 
  [-3.920]  [-4.180]  [-2.540]  [-3.890]  [-0.444]  . 
V(dIncome)  0.414
***  0.401
***  0.546
***  0.536
***  0.346
***  0.297
*** 
  [3.270]  [3.250]  [3.740]  [3.820]  [3.202]  [3.220] 
Investment  1.097
*  1.199
*  -0.830  .  -0.429  . 
  [1.470]  [1.620]  [0.964]  .  [-0.673]  . 
MktSize  4.470
***  3.222
***  -2.575
*  -2.880
*  -2.700
**  -2.490
*** 
  [3.149]  [4.450]  [-1.580]  [-1.870]  [-2.270]  [-5.000] 
Bond  -0.413
*  -0.432
*  -0.036  .  0.249  0.326
** 
  [-1.800]  [-1.900]  [-.1360]  .  [1.270]  [2.113] 
Tax -Spare  -0.512
**  -0.498
**  -0.716
***  -0.723
***  0.122  . 
  [-2.550]  [-2.510]  [-3.090]  [-3.170]  [0.431]  . 
N  390  390  390  390  390  390 
F  15.03  23.24  11.20  22.26  6.32  14.11 
R-squared  0.359  0.355  0.2948  0.290  0.191  0.2163 
***, 
**, and 
* indicate significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a t-test.   38
Table 5. OLS estimates of up-front fees on other terms of the loan 
The dependent variable in column (a) is the weighted average of the up-front fees in percentage as they appear on the 
contract. The dependent variable in column (b) is the weighted average of the u p-front fees in percentage as an 
equivalent margin above the basis rate. Exogenous variables are: Spread is the spread above the basis rate; Lifetime is 
the life length of the loan. 
    (a)      (b)   
Regressors  Coeff.  t-Student  p-value  Coeff.  t-Student  p-value 
Spread  0.342  7.98  0.000  0.121  6.30  0.000 
Lifetime  0.041  4.09  0.000  -0.027  -5.99  0.000 
Constant  0.094  1.06  0.288  0.330  8.29  0.000 
Observations  435      435     
F  39.40      38.85     
R-squared  0.155      0.153     
   39
Table 6. Least-squared estimate of the non-linear model with exogenous split-up of payments 
The endogenous variable is ln( spread) the logarithm of the average spread over the benchmark. Reported exogenous 
variables are: Inflation is the yearly month-to-month consumer prices increase; Liquidity is the foreign currencies 
reserves to short-term debt ratio; solvency is the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt to GNP; 
dIncome is the last five years GNP-per-capita returns average; V(dIncome) is the variability of income per capita 
return in the last five years; Investment is the national gross investment to GNP ratio; MktSize is the share of the 
country private creditors debt relative to all LDC debt; Bond is the share of private creditors debt in the form of bonds. 
The coefficient column report the estimated values. 
Regressors    Coefficient  St. Dev.  t-Statistics  p-values 
ßo  Constant  0.206  0.198  1.040  0.298 
ß1  Inflation  0.509  0.139  3.670  0.000 
ß2  Liquidity  -0.075  0.029  -2.560  0.011 
ß3  Solvency  0.566  0.263  2.150  0.032 
ß4  dIncome  -3.537  1.548  -2.290  0.023 
ß5  V(dIncome)  0.793  0.231  3.440  0.001 
ß6  Investment  -0.978  0.673  -1.450  0.147 
ß7  MktSize  -1.128  1.492  -0.760  0.450 
ß8  Bond  -0.113  0.187  -0.600  0.546 
N=390  R
2=0.52  F=31.64         40
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of the eurobonds sample 
Descriptive statistics of the sample of euro-currency floating rate denominated bonds issued by LDCs sovereigns 
during the period, 1983-1997Variables are: Country is the issuing country; Observations is the number of 
observations; Spread is the mean value of the spread. 
Country  Observations  Spread  Country  Observations  Spread 
Argentina  5  2.010  Panama  1  1.000 
Brazil  2  1.840  Pakistan  3  2.690 
China  11  0.800  Russia  3  0.729 
Colombia  2  1.260  South Africa  1  0.250 
Czech Republic  1  0.230  South Korea  13  0.249 
Ecuador  1  4.750  Sri Lanka  1  1.500 
India  3  0.400  Thailand  4  0.125 
Malaysia  3  0.100  Turkey  3  1.750 
Moldavia  1  2.500  Trinidad & Tobago  1  1.370 
Mexico  9  2.190  Venezuela  7  1.860   41
Table 8. Mean difference between interest margins on bank credits and bonds 
Descriptive table of the difference between the first spread designed on syndicated loans and public bonds on a sample 
of euro-currency floating rate loans issued by LDCs sovereigns during the period, 1983-1997. Variables are: Obs. is 
the number of observations; Mean is the mean value of the difference; Negative is the number of strictly negative 
observations (i.e. bank loans charge a lower interest margin). 
Window period  All Observations  Observations with an up-front fee 
  Obs.  Mean  Negative  Obs.  Mean  Negative 
30 days  6  0.22  0  2  0.188  0 
60 days  12  0.22  0  6  0.125  0 
90 days  15  0.17  2  8  0.014  2 
180 days  23  -0.00  7  15  -0.178  7 
360 days  55  0.09  18  41  0.032  16 
   42
Table 9. Interest spread, lifetime and currency denomination of bank loans and bonds issued within sixty days 
The table reports interest margins and lifetimes designed on all pairs of syndicated loans and public bonds that are 
launched by one identical LDC sovereign in a window period of 60 days during the period, 1983-1997. Variables are: 
Bank is the interest spread of the bank loans (percentage); Bond is the interest spread of the bond debt (percentage); 
Fees is the equivalent additional yearly margin associated with the up-front fees (percentage); Lifetime is the duration 
in number of years of respectively the bank and the bond loans; Dummies indicate that the currency and/or the basis 
rate are identical on the bank and the bond debts (1-value). 
Pair Number    Interest margins and fees    Lifetime    Dummies 
    Bank  Fees  Bond    Bank  Bond    Currency  Basis 
1    0.500  0.260  0.125    8.00  12.00    1  1 
2    0.250  0.035  0.188    10.00  10.00    1  1 
3    0.250  0.071  0.188    10.00  10.00    1  1 
4    1.125  0.152  0.550    2.00  5.00    1  1 
5    0.550  0.000  0.350    15.00  3.00    1  1 
6    1.750  1.457  1.750    3.00  1.00    1  1 
7    1.750  1.457  1.750    3.00  3.00    1  1 
8    1.750  1.457  1.750    3.00  2.00    1  1 
9    3.000  0.092  0.875    10.00  7.00    1  1 
10    5.375  0.000  5.375    2.00  2.00    1  1 
11    5.375  0.000  5.375    2.00  2.00    1  1 
12    0.375  0.012  0.250    7.00  5.00    0  1 
13    1.500  0.298  1.375    7.00  5.25    0  1 
14    0.125  0.000  0.062    1.50  20.25    0  1 
15    0.625  0.483  0.250    8.00  7.00    0  1 
16    0.125  0.078  0.125    10.00  20.00    0  1 
17    0.500  0.132  0.375    8.00  15.00    0  1 
18    1.250  0.271  0.188    8.00  5.00    0  1 
19    0.550  0.000  0.300    15.00  5.00    0  1 
20    0.875  0.000  0.150    3.00  4.00    0  1 
21    0.875  0.000  0.125    3.00  3.00    0  1 
22    0.500  0.000  0.188    10.00  10.00    1  0 
23    0.100  0.000  0.375    8.00  15.00    0  0 
24    0.100  0.000  0.125    8.00  20.00    0  0 
25    0.100  0.000  0.125    8.00  20.00    0  0 
26    0.100  0.446  0.250    8.00  7.00    0  0 
27    0.780  0.000  0.275    3.00  3.00    0  0 
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